1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Confidential Health-Care Records by Hagan, Karen M.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 9
Spring 1998
1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases:
Confidential Health-Care Records
Karen M. Hagan
Roger Williams University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hagan, Karen M. (1998) "1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Confidential Health-Care Records," Roger Williams University
Law Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol3/iss2/9
408 ROGER WILLLAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:387
Confidential Health-Care Records. Washburn v. Rite Aid
Corp., 695 A.2d 495 (R.I. 1997). A witness, subpoenaed to provide
confidential health-care information at a judicial proceeding, must
not disclose such information to a third party unless the disclosure
was authorized by the court or by the individual who is the subject
of the confidential health-care information.
In 1986, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found a particular
section of the Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act (Con-
fidentiality Act)' unconstitutional.2 However, the privilege of lim-
ited confidentiality created by the Act was not eliminated by that
decision. The Confidentiality Act protects the disclosure of confi-
dential health-care information to unauthorized third parties un-
less doing so falls within a statutory exception or the privilege
holder consents to such disclosure.3 If confidential health-care in-
formation is subpoenaed, then the witness must strictly follow the
procedures set forth in that subpoena.4
FACTS AND CASE TRAVEL
In 1992, the plaintiff, Christine Washburn (Christine), and her
estranged husband, Robert Washburn (Robert), were in the pro-
cess of getting a divorce.5 Christine was pregnant at this time.6
During the divorce proceedings, Robert filed a motion seeking to
restrain Christine from ingesting prescription drugs without the
court's consent.7 The Rhode Island Family Court scheduled a
hearing for May 5, 1992.8 Robert's attorney prepared a subpoena
duces tectum requesting Rite Aid Corporation (Rite Aid) to bring to
the hearing all prescription drug records for Christine and Robert
for the period between June of 1987 to June of 1992. Christine did
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6 (1976).
2. See Bartlett v. Danti, 503 A.2d 515, 517 (R.I. 1986) (holding that Rhode
Island General Laws section 5.37.3-6(a), which provided the general rule that con-
fidential-health information is not subject to the compulsory-legal process in any
proceeding, violated the separation of powers mandated by Article Five of the
Rhode Island Constitution).
3. See Washburn v. Rite Aid Corp., 695 A.2d 495, 498 (R.I. 1997).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 496.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 497. The motion also sought a court order preventing Christine
from moving their other two children from Rhode Island. See id.
8. See id.
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not receive a copy of the subpoena or any other form of notice that
these records had been subpoenaed.9
The local Rite Aid pharmacy gathered the requested records
and sent them to its corporate office, along with the subpoena.' 0 A
corporate officer/attorney reviewed the records. Instead of bringing
them to court, Rite Aid mailed them directly to Robert's attorney
with an authenticating affidavit." This was not in accordance
with Rhode Island General Laws section 9-17-5, which requires a
subpoenaed witness to attend the proceedings for at least one
day.' 2
Christine sued Rite Aid. She contended that Rite Aid violated
the Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act' 3 and the Pri-
vacy Act' 4 when it disclosed her prescription drug records without
strictly complying with the subpoena.' 5 The Rhode Island Supe-
rior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Rite Aid,' 6 rely-
ing on Bartlett v. Danti17 and State v. Almonte.' 8 Christine
appealed.' 9
BACKGROUND
At common law, Rhode Island did not recognize a physician-
patient privilege. 20 The privilege was created by statute.2' The
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. Rhode Island General Laws section 9-17-5 (1995) provides:
[e]very witness who shall be duly served with a subpoena in behalf of any
party to a suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, and shall have his lawful
fees tendered to him for his travel from his place of abode to the place at
which he shall be summoned to attend, and for one (1) day's attendance,
shall be obliged to attend accordingly.
Id.
13. R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-9 (1995).
14. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1 (1997). This issue is not analyzed in this survey
in detail. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Christine stated a right-to-
privacy claim. Rite Aid's unauthorized disclosure of Christine's prescription drug
records to her husband's attorney violated her right to be secure from unreasona-
ble intrusion and her right to be secure from unreasonable publicity given to one's
private life. See Washburn, 695 A.2d at 499-500.
15. See Washburn, 695 A.2d at 498-99.
16. See id. at 496-97.
17. 503 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1986).
18. 644 A.2d 295 (R.I. 1994).
19. See Washburn, 695 A.2d at 497.
20. See State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 734 (R.I. 1997).
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current version of the Confidentiality Act creates a privilege that
protects a person's confidential health-care records from unauthor-
ized disclosure to third persons. 22 However, this privilege is lim-
ited and is therefore not a blanket privilege. The statute
establishes exceptions to the privilege. However, the exceptions
enumerated in the version of the statute that was applicable to
this case did not include the information being subject to compul-
sory legal processes without obtaining the privilege holder's
consent. 2
3
In Bartlett v. Danti,24 the Rhode Island Supreme Court found
that section 5-37.3-6 of the Confidentiality Act 25 was unconstitu-
tional because it barred the production of confidential heath-care
records during a judicial proceeding. 26 The court in Bartlett found
that the exclusion of confidential health-care records from compul-
sory legal process violated the separation-of-powers doctrine as
provided by Article Five of the Rhode Island Constitution.27 The
court reasoned that the statute interfered with the subpoena
power of the judiciary and the court's discretion in determining the
21. See id.
22. See Washburn, 695 A,2d at 498; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6(a)
(Supp. 1997).
Except as provided in subsection (b), confidential health care communica-
tions shall not be subject to compulsory legal process in any type of judi-
cial proceeding, and a patient or his or her authorized representative shall
have the right to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclos-
ing, his or her confidential health care communications in any such
proceedings.
Id.
23. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6(b) (Supp. 1976). The statute was
amended in 1996 and included a procedure for the disclosure of confidential-
health-care information in judicial proceedings. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6.1
(Supp. 1997).
24. 503 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I. 1986).
25. R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6(a) (1976). The statute provides:
Except as provided in subparagraph (2) hereof, confidential health care
information shall not be subject to compulsory legal process in any type of
proceeding, including, but not limited to, any civil or criminal case or leg-
islative or administrative proceedings or in any pre-trial or other prelimi-
nary proceedings, and a patient or his authorized representative shall
have the right to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclos-
ing, his confidential health care information in any such proceedings.
Id.
26. See Bartlett, 503 A.2d at 518.
27. See id. at 517. Article 5 provides that "[tihe powers of the government
shall be distributed into three departments: The legislative, executive and judi-
cial." Id. (quoting R.I. Const., art. IV).
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admissibility of relevant evidence. 28 Additionally, the court held
that the Act makes an arbitrary distinction without a rational ba-
sis when it authorizes the production of confidential health-care
information without the patient's consent in a workers' compensa-
tion proceeding,29 while barring it in most other actions.30
In State v. Almonte,31 the court reaffirmed its holding that the
general exemption of confidential health-care records from the ju-
dicial process is unconstitutional.3 2 The statute at issue in Al-
monte was the Privileged Communications Act.33 This statute was
enacted in response to the court's decision in Bartlett.34 This Act
granted a privilege of confidentiality to medical information by re-
quiring patient consent before medical information can be dis-
closed in any judicial proceeding.35 The court found the statute
unconstitutional because it was equally as broad as the section of
the Confidentiality Act considered in Bartlett.36
Justice Lederberg strongly dissented in Almonte. 37 She noted
that only Rhode Island has concluded that health-caxe privilege
statutes impermissibly intrude on the powers of the judicial
branch.38 The dissent pointed out that communications between
physicians and patients are privileged and are held so in many ju-
risdictions. 39 The majority conceded that this assertion was accu-
rate,40 but distinguished Rhode Island's law of an absolute
privilege from other jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions, the privi-
lege is limited to confidential communications between a physician
and a patient. 41 All other information such as the observations or
physical examination of the patient, are excluded from the privi-
lege. 42 The majority found that the Rhode Island privilege, as codi-
28. See Bartlett, 503 A.2d at 517.
29. See id. at 518. The relevant section is section 5-37.3-4(b)(11).
30. See id.
31. 644 A.2d 295 (R.I. 1994).
32. See id. at 298.
33. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-17-24 (1985).
34. See Almonte, 644 A.2d at 297-98.
35. See id. at 296.
36. See id. at 299.
37. See id. (Lederberg, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 302.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 299.
41. See id.
42. See id.; see, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 49.225, 49.215(1) (Michie 1986);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.235, Rule 504-1(1)(a) & 2 (1993).
1998]
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fled in the Confidentiality Act and the subsequent Privacy Act, was
too broad because it bars all health-care information from the judi-
cial process, including objective tests and observations. 43
ANAL.YSIS AND HOLDING
In Washburn, the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered its
previous holding in Bartlett and Almonte as to the constitutionality
of the Confidentiality Act." Bartlett held section 5-37.3-6 of the
Rhode Island General Laws unconstitutional because of its intru-
sion on judicial powers. 45 Additionally, the Act makes an arbitrary
distinction by exempting health-care records in judicial proceed-
ings other than worker's compensation proceedings. 46 The Wash-
burn court concluded that the underlying privilege created by the
Confidentiality Act was not disturbed by the holdings in Bartlett
and Almonte.47 Thus, the privilege is limited to the non-disclosure
of confidential health-care records to unauthorized third parties,
unless the privilege holder consents or the holder of such informa-
tion has strictly complied with the legal process with respect to
such documents. 48
The plaintiff alleged that Rite Aid failed to comply with the
terms of the subpoena by not personally bringing the documents to
court as required by section 9-17-5 of the Rhode Island General
Laws. 49 The court agreed.50 Section 9-17-5 requires a subpoenaed
witness to attend the judicial proceeding for at least one day.51
The subpoena received by Rite Aid commanded the witness to
bring the records to court rather than respond by certified mail as
allowed by section 9-19-39 of the Rhode Island General Laws. 5 2
Even if the subpoena as prepared by Robert's attorney allowed
Rite Aid to respond by certified mail, such response would not have
43. See Almonte, 644 A.2d at 299.
44. Washburn v. Rite Aid Corp., 695 A.2d 495, 498 (R.I. 1997).
45. Bartlett v. Danti, 503 A.2d 515, 517 (R.I. 1986).
46. See id. at 518.
47. Washburn, 695 A.2d at 498.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 497.
50. See id. at 498.
51. See id. at 497 n.3; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-17-5 (1997); supra note 12.
52. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19-39(2)(a) (1997) (allowing an employee of any health-
care facility to respond by certified mail after notification to the attorney request-
ing the information and notification of all attorneys or other parties to the
proceeding).
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been in accordance with section 9-19-39. 53 Rite Aid is not a
"health-care facility" as defined by statute.54 The fact that Rite
Aid is not a "health-care facility" does not exempt it from the provi-
sions of the Confidentiality Act. Rite Aid was a "third party" as
defined under section 5-37.3-3(14). 55 Therefore, Rite Aid was re-
quired to follow the provisions of the Act.
The court summarized its position by stating that confidential
health-care information may be disclosed in a compulsory legal
process without a person's consent.5 6 However, such disclosure is
not without its procedural safeguards. The privilege holder must
be notified of the subpoena, given an opportunity to review the in-
formation being offered, given the chance to object and granted the
occasion to request protective limitations pertaining to the nature,
extent and use of such records. 57 By failing to follow the strict pro-
cedures set out in the subpoena, Rite Aid violated the Confidential-
ity Act. Therefore, Rite Aid was liable to the privilege holder for
actual damages, and on remand, if the court deems it appropriate,
exemplary damages. 58
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the popular belief that health-care information is
absolutely protected from disclosure, such information may be dis-
closed in a judicial proceeding. Disclosure is necessary because
blanket nondisclosure would hinder the judicial process by exempt-
ing relevant information. Relevant evidence is necessary for the
court to perform its function of fairly adjudicating controversies
53. See Washburn, 695 A.2d at 498.
54. See id.; see R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-17-2(5) (defining, in pertinent part, a
health-care facility as "any institutional health service provider, facility or institu-
tion, place, building, agency, or portion thereof... used, operated, or engaged in
providing health care services").
55. See Washburn, 695 A.2d at 498-99; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-3(14)
(Supp. 1997) (stating that a third party is "a person other than the patient to
whom the confidential health care information relates and other than a health care
provider)."
56. See Washburn, 695 A.2d at 498.
57. See id. at 498. The Confidentiality Act was amended by Pub. L. 1996, ch.
248, § 3, and Pub. L. 1996, ch. 266, § 3. The amendments were not applicable in
Washburn. The amendments establish procedures for the disclosure of health-care
information. See Washburn, 695 A.2d at 498 n.5.
58. See id. at 501; see, e.g., Palmisano v. Toth, 624 A.2d 314, 318 (R.I. 1993)
(holding that a defendant may be liable for exemplary damages if the malice rose
to the level of criminality).
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properly. However, disclosure of such information cannot be freely
supplied to third parties. Procedural safeguards are in place to
protect the sensitive nature of confidential health-care informa-
tion. When a party to an action requests confidential health-care
information, it is the discretion of the privilege holder, or the court,
to allow such information to become part of the record.
Karen M. Hagan
